Modelling of (mis)communication by Mustajoki, Arto
MODELLING OF (MIS)COMMUNICATION
Arto MUSTAJOKI, Hel sinki, Fin land
Uni ver sity of Hel sinki
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The pur pose of  the pa per is to pres ent a multi-lay ered model of
(mis) communication., sub stan tial step for ward in re search on (mis)com -
mu ni ca tion. In or der to reach such a goal we are go ing to cre ate a multi-
 lay ered model of com mu ni ca tion, en abling one to de fine and clas sify dif -
fe r ent types of com mu ni ca tion fail ures. Be fore giv ing a short over view of 
re search on this is sue, a clar i fi ca tion of the topic is needed. Non-un der -
stand ing is a wider con cept than miscommunication. Consider the ex -
am p les (1)–(3).
(1) (John does n’t un der stand Mary / US for eign pol icy / mod ern art.
(2) (John did n’t un der stand the play he watched.
(3) (John did n’t un der stand what Mary said. 
Ex am ple (1) dem on strates non-un der stand ing at an ab stract level; we
are not deal ing with a par tic u lar sit u a tion of com mu ni ca tion, but with
John’s more or less per ma nent opin ions, at ti tudes, or abil i ties (he dis likes
Mary’s be hav iour and US for eign pol icy, or is un able to un der stand mod -
ern art). Ex am ple (3), on the con trary, is clearly con nected to a con crete
sit u a tion of com mu ni ca tion which took place in the past. Ex am ple (2)
stands some where be tween (1) and (3): it re fers to a real oc cur rence in
John’s life, but here it is not just a sin gle ut ter ance that John failed to un -
der stand, but a larger frag ment of com mu ni ca tion (in this case, a play).
The scope of the Pro ject is re stricted to cases like (3), but the ap proach
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and model which will be in tro duced be low may be mod i fied so as to be
applicable to the description of cases like (1) and (2) as well.
We must fur ther clar ify our clas si fi ca tion of the dif fer ent de grees and
forms of com mu ni ca tion fail ures, and the ter mi nol ogy used in this con -
nec tion. As a mat ter of fact, the ex is tence of a va ri ety of dif fer ent terms
re flects the com plex ity of the phe nom e non. Even more con fus ingly, re -
search ers tend to use the same terms with dif fer ent mean ings (for rea son -
ing about these and other terms, see, e.g. Grimshaw 1980, Coupland & al. 
1991; Foppa 1995, Weigand 1999, Tzanne 2000). The main cases are
mis un der stand ing (the re cip i ent un der stands the ut ter ance dif fer ently
from what the speaker meant) and non-un der stand ing of a phrase (the
re cip i ent fails al to gether to un der stand what the speaker said). Mis com -
mu nication and com mu ni ca tion fail ure are a wider con cept, also in clu -
d ing, among oth ers, non-lis ten ing, mis hear ing, and non-hear ing. How -
ever, what is re ally hap pen ing from the point of view of suc cess ful com -
mu ni ca tion is not al ways clear. I will dis cuss the bor der line cases later in
the text. Fur ther terms used in this con text are break downs / dis com fort /
dis tur bances in com mu ni ca tion, mis in ter pre ta tions, non-suc ces ses in
talk. At this stage we will not go into de tails of ter mi nol ogy, but will use
the fol low ing work ing def i ni tions. Miscommunication takes place when 
the in ter pre ta tion made by the re cip i ent sig nif i cantly dif fers form what
the speaker meant. There are two main cases of miscom mu ni ca tion. We
use the term com mu ni ca tion dis tur bance when the mes sa ge – for some
rea son or other (non-lis ten ing, non-hear ing) – does n’t reach the re cip i ent
or reaches her/him in the wrong shape (slips of the tongue, mishearings).
Com mu ni ca tion fail ure oc curs when the message reaches the re ci p i -
ent’s cognition in the right form, but (s)he handles it in a way which leads
to misinterpretation of the message. 
Zaefferer (1977) was one of the first re search ers who tried to clas sify
com mu ni ca tion fail ures by us ing a ma trix with 3 x 8 the o ret i cally pos si -
ble types of mis un der stand ings.  As Falkner (1997: 32-33) has shown, the 
sys tem ati za tion made by Zaefferer is in ter est ing as such, but many im -
por tant fac tors re main un no ticed. Grimshaw (1980) dif fer en ti ates pos si -
ble out comes of com mu ni ca tive events: non-hear ing, un der stand ing as
in tended, non (or par tial or am big u ous) un der stand ing, mishearings and
mis un der stand ings. Bazzanella’s and Damiano’s works (1997, 1999) are
im por tant due to sta tis ti cal data on the fre quency of dif fer ent types of fail -
ures, though they deal only with fail ures based on lin guis tic fea tures (cf.
––– 251 –––
also Yus Ramos 1998). This is an im por tant view, but it ig nores many
other as pects of miscommunication. Un con ven tional, rather formal  mo -
dels are provided by Anolli (2001) and Adrissono et al. (1998).
There are in ter est ing stud ies on clas si fi ca tion of miscommunication in
lan guages other than Eng lish. The clas si fi ca tion pre sented in (Ermakova & 
Zem skaja 1993) im presses by the amount of fac tual ma te rial and de tai led
ana l y sis. Work ing on Ukrai nian ma te rial, Baceviè (2006) pro vides a de tai -
led tax on omy of causes of miscommunication, dif fer en ti at ing three ba sic
types: those caused (1) by the interlocutors, (2) by the speech sit u a ti on, and 
(3) by the code (lan guage). One of the most so phis ti cated anal y ses of types
of miscommunication is Falkner’s study (1997) where he dif fer en ti ates a
va ri ety of causes: (1) articulative, auditive or acous tic (“lautlich”); (2) cul -
tural dif fer ences; (3) dif fer ences in knowl edge; (4) in ten tional com mu ni ca -
tion fail ures; (5) spe cial ex pec ta tions on the ba sic of scripts; (6) cotext. 
An other ap proach to miscommunication is dem on strated by Linell (1995;
cf. also Hinnenkamp 2001, 2003). While the re search ers men tioned above
clas sify its causes, Linell wants to clar ify how com mu ni ca tion fail ures oc cur
in a flow of di a logue, how “vis i ble” they are. He there fore di vi des them into
three main cat e go ries: “overt”, “la tent”, and “co vert” ones. So, we are deal -
ing with the re ac tions of the in ter loc u tors to the sit u a tion they are in volved
in. In overt mis un der stand ing there is an im me di ate rec o g ni tion of a mis un -
der stand ing. A co vert mis un der stand ing takes place when the in ter loc u tors
grad u ally rec og nize that they have mis in ter preted each other at an ear lier
stage of con ver sa tion. A la tent mis un der stand ing re mains un rec og nized, but
an out side ob server no tices it or the in ter loc u tors them selves have a feel ing
that ev ery thing in the con ver sa tion was not as it should be. 
This short (and far from com plete) over view shows that there are sev -
eral at tempts to de fine and clas sify com mu ni ca tion fail ures (over views of 
West ern the o ries and clas si fi ca tions of miscommunication can by found,
among oth ers, in Dascal 1999, Tzanne 2000, Olsina 2002). They are, as
such, im por tant and valu able, but, as a rule, they take into ac count only a
small frac tion of the rel e vant el e ments of com mu ni ca tion. Thus, we need
a more com pre hen sive the ory of com mu ni ca tion, si mul ta neously cov er -
ing various features of the phenomenon. 
As to West ern re search on miscommunication car ried out un til now, it
seems to be bi ased in two ways. First, a lot of at ten tion has been paid to
sit u a tions where com mu ni ca tion fail ures lead to fa tal con se quences; the
most fa voured top ics of this kind are avi a tion and health care. A sec ond
typ i cal theme of re search has been intercultural com mu ni ca tion (usu ally
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be tween na tive and non-na tive speak ers); in re cent years this in ter est has
ex panded to the use of Eng lish as lin gua franca (i.e. in a con ver sa tion be -
tween two or more non-na tive speak ers). Thus, there is much less re -
search on nor mal ev ery day com mu ni ca tion be tween na tive speak ers of
that lan guage. There are no good rea sons to ne glect the vast ma jor ity of
com mu ni ca tion sit u a tions, be cause com mu ni ca tion fail ures seem to be as 
fre quent in con ver sa tion be tween fam ily mem bers as in contacts with
foreigners. I will come back to this paradoxical claim later.  
In or der to study dif fer ent sit u a tions of (mis)com mu ni ca tion we will
dem on strate a new multi-lay ered model of com mu ni ca tion (MLMC).
The model it self is still at a ten ta tive stage. How ever, it al ready seems to
have more ex plor atory power than pre vi ous mod els. The start ing point of
the model may be sum ma rized in the following claims. 
A. To ex plain the causes of miscommunication we have to pay sys tem -
atic at ten tion to two lay ers:
(1) at the mes sage trans fer level we an swer the ques tion of where (in
which phase) of the mes sage flow from the speaker to the re cip i ent a dis -
tur bance takes place;
(2) at the men tal world level we an swer the ques tion of how the in ter -
loc u tors’ men tal worlds in flu ence the pro cess of pro duc ing and com pre -
hend ing a message. 
B. To ex plain what re ally hap pens in (mis)com mu ni ca tion we have to
take into ac count the be hav iour of the com mu ni cants in that par tic u lar
dis course (di a logue). At this dis course level we meet ques tions like how
fail ures of com mu ni ca tion ac tu ally oc cur and what the in ter loc u tors do in
or der to guar an tee successful communication.
Be fore pre sent ing the model, it is im por tant to note the po si tion of mod -
el ling in sci ence in gen eral. Mod els are sup posed to be re flec tions of the
phe nom e non we are try ing to un der stand and de scribe. On the other hand, 
a model can never be an ex act copy of re al ity. De spite its in com plete ness,
a good model should help us to better com pre hend the el e ments and es -
sence of the phe nom e non con cerned. Thus, the model in fig ure 1 is far
from be ing an ex act pre sen ta tion of the pro cess of com mu ni ca tion and
fac tors in flu enc ing it. To avoid mis in ter pre ta tions I men tion here only
two ob vi ous points of in ac cu racy. First, in re al ity the dif fer ent phases of
the pro cess do not fol low each other in a lin ear or der, but make up a tan -
gled skein of par al lel ac tions. We of ten start to speak be fore we have fully 
de cided what to say, and the re cip i ent may start to cre ate the mes sage
(s)he is lis ten ing to even be fore the speaker has ex pressed him/her self.
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Sec ond, as is clearly shown in (Sinclair & Mauranen 2006), we han dle el -
e ments of speech in chunks. These chunks can be re lated to the ba sic parts 
of the mes sage (prop o si tion P, var i ous modal el e ments M, speech func -
tion F), but this is not nec es sar ily the case in all speech acts. Nev er the less, 
in or der to un der stand the semantic (and functional) structure of an ut ter -
an ce, we have to differentiate regular components of meaning.
The first two lev els of de scrip tion are shown in a sche matic way in the
Fig ure 1.
Let us first pay at ten tion to the in ner part of the fig ure, the mes sage trans -
fer level. As can be seen, it has some sim i lar i ties with Shan non’s (and
Weaver’s) fa mous in for ma tion the ory model. Some newer con cepts (e.g.
Dobrick 1985: 97, Falkner 1997: 88) are even closer to our model. How -
ever, there are three fea tures in the MLMC which make it more pow er ful in
de scrib ing dif fer ent blocks of (mis)com mu ni ca tion. (1) To my mind, the
form of a cir cle better re flects the es sence of com mu ni ca tion than pre vi ous
li n ear pre sen ta tions. One can not deny the fact that com mu ni ca tion takes
pla ce in time which flows for ward lin early, but on the other hand, from the
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Fig ure 1.
point of view of its needs and goals com mu ni ca tion is more like a cir cle:
the speaker be gins from some ideas which are meant to be “re born” in the
re cip i ent’s mind. (2) A rel e vant part of the cir cle is the dis tinc tion be tween
Mean ing and Form. As such the dis tinc tion is sim i lar to the old ob ser va tion 
about the dif fer ence be tween what is said and what is meant. Re search ers
mod el ling com mu ni ca tion do pay at ten tion to this is sue (e.g. Dobrick
1985: 56), but nev er the less leave it out of the model they pres ent. The
asym me try be tween Mean ing and Form is so cru cial both for pro duc ing an
ut ter ance and for un der stand ing it cor rectly that it is worth in clud ing it in
the model it self. In the Func tional Syn tax Model dem on strated in
(Mustajoki 2006a, 2007), this dis tinc tion forms the ba sis of the en tire de -
scrip tion of lan guage. The third (3) dis tinc tive fea ture of the pic ture is as
im por tant. As will be shown later, one can not de scribe the pro cess of com -
mu ni ca tion with out at ten tion to the men tal worlds of the com mu ni cants. 
The op er a tion of the mes sage trans fer level may be dem on strated by the 
fol low ing sim ple ex am ple. Imag ine a sit u a tion where one per son wants to 
ask an other to open a win dow, re fer ring to a cer tain ob ject in the world
RSp. At first the speaker de cides what to say about it. In a formalistic pre -
sen ta tion the mean ing is of the fol low ing type: P (Prop o si tion) = “YOU
OPEN THE WINDOW”, M (Mo dal ity) = the speaker’s mood and at ti -
tude to wards this ex pres sion, and F (Speech Func tion) = “I REQUIRE”.
Us ing her/his abil ity, then, the speaker – more or less un con sciously –
goes over dif fer ent pos si bil i ties for ex press ing this mean ing: Open the
win dow, please; Could you be so kind as to open the win dow, It’s ter ri bly
hot here etc. In the next stage (s)he gives the ex pres sion a ver bal (and/or
non-ver bal) shape. 
A clar i fi ca tion is needed. Al though Fig ure 1 de scribes the pro cess of
pro duc ing an ut ter ance in an os ten si bly prompt way, there are mo ments
of un cer tainty in all its phases. Some ex am ples of this kind: It is a
well-known fact that, from the on to log i cal point of view, var i ous
“worlds” can be dif fer en ti ated. In (Mustajoki 2004), three main types of
“worlds” are de fined: real world, vir tual world (fic tion, fairy tails, dreams 
etc.), in ner world (feel ings, sen sa tion etc.). The “Mean ing” (what we are
aim ing to say) is in many cases a rather sketchy plan for ex press ing some -
thing. Fur ther, there are more “Mean ings” than words in lan guages.
There fore, it is far from be ing a rule that a suit able “Form” can be found
for our “Mean ing”. “Ev ery ut ter ance is only an ap prox i ma tion to the very 
thought the speaker has in mind” (Junker & al. 2003: 1742).  Fauconnier
and Turner (2002: 277, 360) pro vide a sim i lar state ment, but their con clu -
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sion is wrong. The fact that con cep tual sys tems are much richer and
vaster than lin guis tic pos si bil i ties does not dis prove the pro cess where the 
speaker has some thing in mind and then tries to ex press this us ing lin -
guis tic (and other) tools. Fi nally, in pro nounc ing the Form out loud, var i -
ous slips of the tongue are also pos si ble.
When we pro ceed to the re cip i ent’s role in the sit u a tion, we face pos si -
bil i ties for miscommunication. A spe cial case of it oc curs when the re cip -
i ent does not lis ten to the speaker (non-lis ten ing) or fails to hear USp
(non-hear ing); in other words the mes sage does not reach the re cip i ent. It
means that in such a sit u a tion there is no URe. A dif fer ent case is when URe
? USp, i.e. the ut ter ance heard by the re cip i ent does not cor re spond to the
ut ter ance ex pressed by the speaker (mis hear ing). If this phase goes cor -
rectly, the re cip i ent cre ates from URe (a chain of vo cal (and other) com po -
nents) the Form as PRe + MRe + FRe. Then the re cip i ent de codes it to the
Mean ing. Here again there is space for a mis in ter pre ta tion of the mes -
sage: e.g. if the speaker says It’s ter ri bly hot here, it is pos si ble that re cip i -
ent takes it lit er ally and fails to no tice that the state ment is a hint to open
the win dow. Such com mu ni ca tion fail ures can be caused by cul tural dif -
fer ences as in Moeschler’s ex am ple (2004: 51), but they of ten oc cur in
sim ple ev ery day con ver sa tion be tween peo ple. There are also risks of
mis in ter pre ta tions con cern ing the ref er ence of the mes sage.
It is ob vi ous that the de scrip tion out lined dem on strates only the
formalistic part of the pro cess of com mu ni ca tion. To reach a better equiv -
a lence to au then tic con ver sa tion, real per sons with their back grounds and 
abil i ties should be added to the model. In Fig ure 1, var i ous sub jec tive
com po nents have been as sem bled un der the no tion of Men tal World
(MW). One of our main hy poth e ses is that dif fer ences be tween the
speaker’s and re cip i ent’s MWs play a de ci sive role in com mu ni ca tion.
This is a not a new point of view as such, but we ar gue that the sig nif i -
cance of MWs can be seen in com mu ni ca tion fail ures which have tra di -
tion ally been re garded as “lin guis tic”. A sim ple ex am ple is needed to
show this. At first glance, oc cur rences of syn tac tic am bi gu ity (a syn tac tic
struc ture can be in ter preted in more than one way) can be ex plained from
a purely lin guis tic point of view. A more care ful anal y sis of these sit u a -
tions shows, how ever, that as a mat ter of fact it is not the am big u ous
struc tures them selves that cause mis un der stand ings, but the dif fer ences
in the MWs of the speaker and of the re cip i ent. Thus, the in ter loc u tors, as
a rule, have the same in ter pre ta tion of the phrase (1) John stud ies Chi nese 
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lan guage and lit er a ture, on the one hand, and of the phrase (2) John stud -
ies Chi nese lan guage and bi ol ogy, on the other hand: it is ob vi ous that
John stud ies Chi nese lit er a ture but not Chi nese bi ol ogy. By con trast, an
ob vi ous ground for mis in ter pre ta tion is pres ent in the phrase (3) John
stud ies Chi nese lan guage and phi los o phy. The op tion for two read ings of
(3) is based on dif fer ences in peo ple’s MWs con cern ing the con nec tion
be tween these dis ci plines: for some peo ple Chi nese lan guage and Chi -
nese phi los o phy is a nat u ral com bi na tion of stud ies, for oth ers it is not –
and there fore they in ter pret the phrase dif fer ently. Thus, am bi gu ity it self
never causes miscommunication; dif fer ences in MWs are also needed.
Men tal is sues also play a cru cial role in the will ing ness of the re cip i ent to
lis ten to the speaker. Not only ex ter nal dis tur bances (noise, dark ness, etc.)
but also a lack of mo ti va tion on the part of the re cip i ent may pre vent the
mes sage from reach ing her/his at ten tion. On the other hand, a strong mo ti -
va tion en ables the re cip i ent to com ple ment el e ments which (s)he does n’t
hear – for some rea son or other – with the nec es sary lin guis tic units.
Dif fer ent el e ments of the phe nom e non we call Men tal World have been
widely dis cussed in sci en tific lit er a ture. There are nu mer ous terms, no -
tions and ap proaches hav ing some thing in com mon with our con cept.
The the ory of mind is one of the rather pop u lar con cepts here. What we
are try ing to do is to clar ify the com po nents of MW from the point of view 
of com mu ni ca tion and dif fi cul ties in it. As the con cept of MWs is so im -
por tant for ex plain ing and pre vent ing miscommunication, spe cial at ten -
tion has to be paid to this is sue. MWs are sup posed to con sist of the fol -
low ing (partly over lap ping) com po nents: (a) com mu ni ca tive (lin guis tic)
abil ity; (b) cul tural and in tel lec tual back ground; (c) the cog ni tive sys tems 
of the in ter loc u tors; (d) the re la tions be tween the in ter loc u tors; (e) the
emo tional (and phys i o log i cal) state we are in; (f) con tex tual el e ments.
The first four of these are rather sta ble, but not per ma nent: in other words, 
they are in con stant move ment, but the changes are grad ual. The last two
are sit u a tional: they are dif fer ent in each com mu ni ca tion sit u a tion. Let us
now take a closer look at the five el e ments of MW.
(a) The com mu ni ca tive (lin guis tic) abil ity of a per son con sists of
traces of all the sit u a tions where (s)he has learnt and used lan guage(s) as a 
tool of com mu ni ca tion be fore the mo ment of the cur rent sit u a tion of com -
mu ni ca tion. This state ment does not deny the pos si bil ity of cre ativ ity in
pro duc ing speech, but we are able to ne cre ative only on the ba sis of
knowl edge gath ered in our mind through con scious or un con scious learn -
ing and ob ser va tion (cf. Jo seph 2003). Pro duc ing speech is much the
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same as re peat ing, in one way or an other, what we have heard be fore
(Gasparov 1996). We com pare what we are go ing say and what we should 
un der stand with the lin guis tic stor age we have. As Kecskes (2004, 2008)
points out, in a com mu ni ca tion sit u a tion there al ways oc curs a clash (and
com pe ti tion) be tween the cur rent and the old. The large role played by
com mu ni ca tive abil ity ap pears at its clear est, of course, in cases with sub -
stan tial de fects, e.g. in the speech of chil dren or non-na tive speak ers.
How ever, adult na tive speak ers may also come up against words or con -
struc tions they don’t know. The com mu ni ca tive (lin guis tic) abil i ties of
two na tive speak ers are, as a rule, very sim i lar (fig ure 2), es pe cially in
com par i son with a pos si ble case in volv ing a na tive and non-na tive
speaker (fig ure 3). How ever, the com mu ni ca tive abil i ties of two na tive
speak ers (and this is true even for iden ti cal twins) can never be ex actly
the same for the sim ple rea son that peo ple have read dif fer ent texts and
taken part in dif fer ent com mu ni ca tion sit u a tions dur ing their lives. All
this has a cer tain in flu ence on their lin guis tic and com mu ni ca tive abil ity.
Slight dif fer ences can also be fa tal, be cause in a nor mal lively con ver sa -
tion it is not enough that you know the lin guis tic units you hear; you also
have to be able to recognize them immediately in a flow of speech even if
you don’t hear all the words correctly.
(b) Cul tural and in tel lec tual back ground is, like com mu ni ca tive abi l i ty,
based on the per sonal his to ries of the in ter loc u tors. This part of MW has
been a pop u lar topic in re search lit er a ture es pe cially in works on in ter cul tu ral 
com mu ni ca tion. Ter mi nol ogy and con cepts vary. In the  Wes tern tra di ti on,
com monly used terms are pre sup po si tion, ste reo type, script, men tal set,
thought struc ture, scene, and schema. They see the is sue from dif fer ent po -
ints of view, but as a whole all of them are con nected with the no tion of MW.
In Rus sian lin guis tics and eth nog ra phy, a lot of at ten tion has been pa id to
cul tur ally de pend ent con cepts and the no tions of kartina mira (world pic -
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       Fig ure 2.                                                       Fig ure 3.             
ture) and jazykovaya kartina mira (lin guis tic world pic ture) (Stepanov 2001,
Šmeljov 2002, among oth ers; cf. “im ages of the world” in Cam pos 2007).
Stud ies on cog ni tive ba sis, in di vid ual and col lec tive space (pro st ran stvo) by
a num ber of schol ars (Krasnyh 2002, Gudkov 2003, and oth ers) adapt and
de velop the ideas of the Rus sian psy cho log i cal school (Vy got sky, Luriya,
Leontjev) in the frame work of intercultural com mu ni ca ti on. In most cases,
the no tion of cul tural and in tel lec tual back ground is used in con tem po rary
re search for de scrib ing the dif fer ences be tween in ter loc u tors in intercultural
(interethnic) con ver sa tion. Less at ten tion has been paid to dif fer ences be -
tween peo ple within the same lan guage com mu nity. Our ev e ry day ex pe ri -
ence con firms that the role of dif fer ences in cul tural back gro unds is ex -
tremely im por tant also be tween na tive speak ers. To be con vin ced about this,
one needs only to imag ine a sit u a tion where a spe cial ist or lover of a cer tain
ac tiv ity (sur geon, vi o lin ist, foot ball fan) tries to ex plain de tails of her/his ob -
ject of in ter est to an ig no rant per son. Dif fer ences in the MWs of the in ter loc -
u tors cause com mu ni ca tion fail ures even in con ver sa ti on be tween fam ily
 mem bers. A very typ i cal case is like the fol low ing: one is asked to bring beer
/ choc o late / bread  from the shop, and is then blamed for non-hear ing of the
re quest be cause the beer / choc o late / bread that one brought was of the
wrong kind from the point of view of the per son who ma de the re quest. The
ob vi ous rea son for com mu ni ca tion fail ure is the dis si m i lar ity of rep re sen ta -
tions of beer / choc o late / bread in the in ter loc u tors’ MWs. 
A fur ther ex pla na tion helps us to com pre hend the es sence of this fac tor.
Peo ple’s in tel lec tual and cog ni tive back grounds are, in fact, very sim i lar.
All peo ple around the world pos sess a huge num ber of sim i lar pieces of
knowl edge, such as “peo ple are mor tal”, “if you jump up, you will fall
down”, “you use ears for hear ing”, “all an i mals have to eat and sleep”. It
is im pos si ble to count the amount of such shared knowl edge, but there are 
good rea sons to es ti mate that it makes up the clear ma jor ity of the knowl -
edge we pos sess. Such a claim is against our com mon im pres sion of the
great va ri ety in peo ple’s world pic tures. This con tra dic tion can be ex -
plained by the way peo ple’s senses work: we don’t no tice things which
are com mon and reg u lar, but pay at ten tion to dis sim i lar i ties and dif fer -
ences. In a way we face a sim i lar ef fect in genes: al though the num ber of
genes that are dif fer ent be tween hu man be ings is very, very small (some -
thing like 0,1 %), we see in hu mans mainly those fea tures whereby we
dif fer from each other. 
(c) The cog ni tive sys tems of the in ter loc u tors are more or less per ma -
nent pat terns and ste reo types of think ing. One can not to tally sep a rate
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them from cul tural and in tel lec tual back ground. But what is meant here
are deeper cog ni tive pro cesses and pat terns, which are more closely con -
nected to peo ple’s per sonal traits. There is clear ev i dence of dif fer ences in 
cog ni tive pro cesses be tween peo ple (Sloman 1996, Lieberman 2000,
Stanovich & West 2000, Nisbett & al. 2001). These fea tures can not be ig -
nored in seek ing ex pla na tions for some prob lems in hu man in ter ac tion.
The pos si ble role of these fac tors has been ex am ined, e.g., in the con text
of dif fer ences be tween rep re sen ta tives of dif fer ent re search fields
(Rapoport 1974: 259, Berger 2007, Nichols & Ulatowski 2007: 363).
(d) The re la tions be tween the in ter loc u tors are also an ob vi ous fac tor 
in com mu ni ca tion and dif fi cul ties in it. A widely used ca sual word in this
con nec tion is chem is try. Pos i tive chem is try be tween in ter loc u tors fos ter
mu tual un der stand ing, neg a tive chem is try in hib its or hin ders it. An ex -
am ple of the for mer case is con ver sa tion be tween lov ers; the lat ter case is
seen in hos tile con tacts with en e mies. These are ex treme ex am ples. Less
dra matic but still re mark able in flu ence of this fac tor can be seen in most
com mu ni ca tion sit u a tions. 
(e) Emo tional and phys i o log i cal state: per sonal feel ings such as sor -
row or de light, and states like ill ness or tired ness, in ev i ta bly have a cer -
tain in flu ence on the way we com mu ni cate. Are they also pos si ble causes
of miscommunication? Here, again, common sense ex pe ri ence gives
grounds for an af fir ma tive an swer. It is ob vi ous that it is hard for a tired,
de pressed, fright ened, or se ri ously ill per son to con cen trate on her/his
own or an other per son’s speech. Se lec tive hear ing or non-hear ing are also 
typ i cal of a re cip i ent af ter (s)he has been of fended by the speaker. In such
a sit u a tion, the modal part of the mes sage (M) takes the whole scene and
the other el e ments (P) and (F) are lost from view. 
(f) Con tex tual el e ments con sist of the en vi ron ment we are in, what we
see and hear. They may have var i ous con se quences for the flow of com mu -
ni ca tion. If the re cip i ent sees some thing in ter est ing hap pen ing be hind the
speaker, (s)he may con cen trate on that in stead of lis ten ing. If the speaker
says that a cer tain John is go ing to join the com pany, the re cip i ent can make 
the mis take of as sum ing that the man ap proach ing at the mo ment is John.
As a whole, the com mu ni cants may make dif fer ent in ter pre ta tions about
the en vi ron ment they are in. Some times, when the speaker is just talk ing
and the re cip i ent is pre tend ing to lis ten, both com mu ni cants are happy with 
the sit u a tion if the speaker has an ur gent need to tell some body what (s)he
has ex pe ri enced. One can ask whether non-lis ten ing means miscom mu ni -
ca tion here. The same can hap pen at a noisy party where peo ple are small-
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 talk ing about this and that. In such a sit u a tion the speech func tion (F) is
given the ma jor role in stead of the con tent of the mes sage (P). In such sit u a -
tions, one can re gard as miscommunication only cases where the com mu -
ni cants’ aims are dif fer ent. If the speaker ex pects care ful lis ten ing from the
re cip i ent, non-lis ten ing leads to miscommunication. 
We have now out lined the pro cess of com mu ni ca tion and the role of
MWs in it. The next step is to go to the dis course level. Let us start with
the first ques tion men tioned above: how fail ures of com mu ni ca tion in
fact oc cur, or, in other words, what their con crete dis tin guish ing fea tures
are in the flow of di a logue. In try ing to an swer these ques tions, we come
closer to the def i ni tion of com mu ni ca tion fail ures. As a start ing point we
can use Linell’s clas si fi ca tion men tioned above. In an overt case the in ter -
loc u tors no tice the fail ure im me di ately: the re cip i ent asks for clar i fi ca tion 
and the speaker re peats or re pairs (says in other words) what (s)he has
said. In a co vert case the com mu ni ca tion fail ures be come clear later in the 
con ver sa tion. If the pre vi ous cases can eas ily be re garded as com mu ni ca -
tion fail ures, a more dif fi cult sit u a tion from the point of view of def i ni tion 
is a case where the com mu ni cants do not rec og nize miscommunication,
in other words it is la tent. To solve the dis tinc tion prob lem we have to re -
turn to the def i ni tion we gave at the be gin ning of the pro posal. Ac cord ing
to this def i ni tion, we are deal ing with miscommunication re gard less of
whether it has been rec og nized or not. 
Con sider fur ther def i ni tion prob lems. We of ten use the so called “let it
pass” mode (cf. Firth 1996) in con ver sa tion. We may thus oc ca sion ally
ig nore phrases or words that are un fa mil iar to us, and in most cases this is
harm less enough be cause (a) their mean ing will be come clear later dur ing 
the con ver sa tion, or (b) they are not rel e vant to the main sub stance of the
dis cus sion. Let us take a sim ple ex am ple. John is tell ing Mary that Harry
plays squash. Mary is not fa mil iar with this game. The rel e vance of the
lack of un der stand ing de pends on the sit u a tion. In many cases it is enough 
to un der stand that Harry plays some thing. A pre cise un der stand ing is
needed if John asks Mary to buy a squash racket for Harry. In ex am in ing
such ex am ples we have to give the word rel e vant a con crete mean ing.
A spe cial case is var i ous sit u a tions where peo ple cheat (lies, “de vi a -
tions from the truth”). If the teacher says that an ant has six feet or if John
lies to her mother that he was with a friend, are we deal ing with a case of
miscommunication? Ac cord ing to our def i ni tion the an swer is no, if the
re cip i ent un der stands the mes sage in the same way as the speaker has
meant. Irony is an other in ter est ing case. If Pe ter says with a spe cial tone
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to Laura that she has a beau ti ful hat, and means the op po site, a com mu ni -
ca tion fail ure takes place only if Laura un der stands the phrase lit er ally.   
One more fun da men tal ques tion of def i ni tion. A fur ther in ter est ing ques -
ti on is whether we also have to take into ac count the con se quences of com -
mu ni ca tion. Com ing back to the “open the win dow” ex am ple, we can ask
whether it is a case of miscommunication when the per son who is asked to
open the win dow un der stands the mes sage but will not open the win dow.
From the point of the speaker it is a fail ure in the sense that her/his needs
will not have been sat is fied. An other sit u a tion: we ask in the street how to
go to the rail way sta tion, and get a wrong an swer. We un der stand ev ery -
thing cor rectly, but again from our point of our needs the com mu ni ca tion
has led to un de sir able re sults. Nev er the less, ac cord ing to our def i ni tion,
these cases do not rep re sent miscommunication, be cause the re cip i ent un -
der stands the mes sage in the same way as the speaker has meant; maybe we 
could use the term un suc cess ful com mu ni ca tion in such cases.
The sec ond ques tion we meet at the dis course level is this: what do the
in ter loc u tors do in or der to guar an tee suc cess ful com mu ni ca tion? This
an g le of view is very im por tant in seek ing ex pla na tions for mis com mu ni -
ca tion. Let us start with a claim which is com monly con firmed by most
peo p le. Ac cord ing to our common sense ex pe ri ence, com mu ni ca tion fail -
ures oc cur as of ten in speech be tween peo ple who are close to each other
(e.g. fam ily mem bers) as in com mu ni ca tion be tween a na tive speaker and 
a for eigner (cf. Ermakova & Zemskaya 1993). One could even ar gue that
the num ber of com mu ni ca tion fail ures is a con stant. This ob ser va tion
seems to con tra dict the role of in ter loc u tors’ men tal worlds. The ex pla na -
tion for this ob ser va tion seems to be found in the dif fer ent modes we use
in com mu ni ca tion. This is not a new find ing. As a mat ter of fact there are
some terms and the o ries which try to con front this phe nom e non. One of
them is re cip i ent de sign in tro duced by Schegloff (see, e.g., Sacks & Sche -
g loff 1979). An other, more psy cho log i cal term used here is altercasting
(Malone 1995). A fur ther term is ne go ti a tion (see e. g. Thomason 2001,
Win ford 2003, Mauranen 2006). Within the com mu ni ca tion ac com mo da -
tion the ory (e.g. Giles 1973) the term con ver gence has been in tro duced; it 
re fers to the speaker’s strat egy to adapt her/his com mu ni ca tive be hav iour
to the re cip i ent. “There is a gen eral pro pen sity for com mu ni ca tors to con -
ver ge along sa lient di men sions of speech and non-ver bal be hav iour in co -
op e r a tive so cial en coun ters” (Ylänne-McEwen & Coupland 2000: 193).
The ac com mo da tion the ory and re cip i ent de sign are rel e vant to many
com mu ni ca tive en coun ters. Fur ther terms have been in tro duced for sit u a -
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tions where it is ap par ent: for ex am ple, baby talk (motherese) and for -
eigner talk are spe cial reg is ters or styles which na tive speak ers use if they 
re al ize that the re cip i ent has only a re stricted lan guage com mand (see e.g. 
Freed 1981). How ever, it would be wrong to think that speak ers al ways
adapt their speech to the re cip i ent. As a mat ter of fact, one of the main
grounds of miscommunication is that re cip i ent de sign fails. If we ex clude 
dis tur bances as a cause of miscommunication, a com mu ni ca tion fail ure
takes place es pe cially when (or only if?) we have failed to adapt our
speech to the re cip i ent’s men tal world. Levinson’s (2006: 46) claim that I
call my neigh bour “Dick” only if  “I think you will rec og nize who I mean
un der that ap pel la tion” is not true in all sit u a tions of com mu ni ca tion for
the sim ple rea son that we as speak ers do not think about that. Our au to -
matic speech pro ces sor does n’t help here ei ther. As pointed out in (Barr & 
Keysar 2005: 23; Keysar 2007), com mu ni ca tion tends to be rather ego -
cen tric. Peo ple are in clined to con cen trate on what they are say ing with -
out think ing of whether it will be un der stood or not. “When peo ple com -
mu ni cate they do not rou tinely take into ac count the men tal states of oth -
ers, as the stan dard the ory as sumes” (Keysar 2007: 72). There fore, for
me, ad ap ta tion / ac com mo da tion / re cip i ent de sign is not the rule of com -
mu ni ca tion, but rather an exception. 
In this con nec tion a note is needed. In the Multi-lay ered Model of Com -
mu ni ca tion one may find con nec tions to the Rel e vance the ory of Sperber
and Wil son (1986 and later). In deed, it is a very fas ci nat ing the ory, which
helps in ter pret many stan dard cases of com mu ni ca tion, but when we start
to ana lyse real di a logues and prob lems in them, we in ev i ta bly en coun ter
in s tances which are hard to de ter mine us ing rel e vance as the only ex pla -
na tion. The be hav iour of the Speaker is one these is sues. If (s)he does n’t
ta ke into ac count the re cip i ent’s men tal world, al though the speaker could 
and should do so, one can not ex plain her/his be hav iour by us ing the rel e -
van ce prin ci ple. 
As clearly pointed out in (Vinokur 1993), the roles of the speaker and
the re cip i ent are dif fer ent in ev ery sin gle act of di a logue – de spite the fact
that in the next turn the roles will change. It is there fore better to dif fer en -
ti ate the roles of the speaker and the re cip i ent in the com mu ni ca tion; this
can be done by us ing the terms ad ap ta tion and co op er a tion.
Thus, in cer tain sit u a tions we ap ply the ad ap ta tion mode to en sure a
more or less nor mal com mu ni ca tion. This is the ex pla na tion for the con -
tro ver sial ob ser va tion we made above. In talk ing with a for eigner we re -
al ize that our men tal worlds are dif fer ent and this is why we sim plify our
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speech in or der to be un der stood. But talk ing with fam ily mem bers we
don’t use the ad ap ta tion mode be cause we “think” (not con sciously) that
our men tal words are sim i lar. Of course, they have a lot of com mon fea -
tures, but also enough dif fer ences to pro vide much ground for mis un der -
stand ings. Con fi dence in speak ing in “the same lan guage” leads also to a
rather short and cryp tic speech – a fur ther rea son for miscommunication.
An other ex am ple of the role of ad ap ta tion mode: re search ers com monly
com plain how dif fi cult it is to do in ter dis ci plin ary co op er a tion be cause
“we don’t un der stand the lan guage they use”. Re search ers in dif fer ent
fields cer tainly do have dif fer ent ter mi nol o gies and back ground knowl -
edge, and pos si bly even a dif fer ent way of think ing. But I think that a no
less im por tant rea son for dif fi cul ties in com mu ni ca tion is that re search ers 
fail to re al ize they should use the ad ap ta tion mode, or that they dis like us -
ing it or fail in their ef forts to use it.
The re cip i ent, in turn, can adopt the co op er a tive mode. Ac cord ing to
widely ex ist ing opin ion, co op er a tion is a nor mal part of any com mu ni ca -
tion (see e.g. Davies 2007). How ever, ob ser va tions of real com mu ni ca -
tion show that this view does not cor re spond to re al ity. Only in cer tain sit -
u a tions does the re cip i ent make spe cial ef forts to help the speaker to ex -
press him self/her self in a proper way. Here again intercultural con ver sa -
tion may pro vide a good ex am ple, as shown in (Kurhila 2003). In
prob lem atic con ver sa tion the use of the co op er a tive mode is very im por -
tant. The re cip i ent can also use a clearly un co op er a tive mode, e.g. (s)he
may have some rea sons to pre tend to un der stand or to pretend not to un -
der stand, as shown in (Mustajoki 2006b: 61-65).
––––––––––––––––––––––––
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